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Introduction
Buyers in auto repair, health care, and other "diagnosis-cure" markets generally are unable to determine their condition, and can neither perfectly observe nor costlessly verify sellers' actions or recommendations. A moral hazard problem arises because sellers have an incentive to distort or misrepresent buyers' condition to increase demand for the treatments they supply. In some cases, buyers and sellers can discourage post-contractual opportunism with contracts that are contingent on verifiable events -for example, lawyers sometimes base their fees on the outcome of the case.
However, explicit contingent contracts have limited application in health care and auto repair markets, possibly because they create new adverse selection or moral hazard problems or because outcomes are not always verifiable. Whether buyers can give sellers incentives to act in their interest in the absence of contractual solutions is an open empirical issue. Anecdotal evidence suggests that at least some sellers in these markets mislead their customers -mechanics recommend unnecessary work, doctors prescribe excessive treatments -but whether these are representative is unknown. This paper studies one segment of the auto repair market -California vehicle emission inspections. In this market, inspectors can affect the probability vehicles fail in ways consumers can neither directly observe nor costlessly verify, and inspection suppliers profit when they repair failed The empirical framework is simple. I specify whether individual vehicles fail inspections as a function of vehicle characteristics and whether the inspector is a state official or works at a private firm. When the inspector works at a private firm, I also include characteristics of the firm as independent variables. I attribute differences in the failure probability, conditional on vehicle characteristics, to differences in how inspectors conduct inspections. Contrasting the behavior of state officials and inspectors at private firms provides evidence regarding the strength of market incentives. Differences across private firms may reflect differences in their internal incentives. I therefore provide an incentive-theoretic interpretation of the cross-firm results. However, these differences could also be due to the process in which consumers select individual firms.
Controlling for differences in vehicles' characteristics and operating condition, inspection failure rates are more than twice as high in inspections conducted by state officials as in those completed at private firms. The main exception is when emission repairs are covered by a warranty at the firm inspecting the vehicle: for late model, low-mileage vehicles inspected at new car dealers.
The incentives presented by consumers in this market are generally quite strong: when consumers incur the full repair costs, inspectors help vehicles pass. One explanation is that inspectors and their firms hope to establish or maintain reputations.
I also find differences in inspection conduct across firms. Failure probabilities are slightly lower at firms with close geographic competitors. They also vary with firms' organizational attributes. After controlling for differences in other firm characteristics such as station age, the number of inspectors, and whether inspectors and mechanics are paid piece rates, failure probabilities are higher at "chain stores" (such as Sears and Pep Boys) than at independent garages, service stations, new car dealers, and tune up shops. Owners face difficulties in providing managers 3 of auto repair shops effective performance incentives when managers are not residual claimants.
Failure probabilities also increase with the number of inspectors employed by the firm. Free rider problems within firms may weaken individual inspectors' incentives to help vehicles pass. Finally, failure probabilities are low at new car dealers for vehicles not under warranty. Klein and Leffler (1981) and Shapiro (1983) suggest that rents provide firms incentives to supply high quality services.
New car dealers have higher prices, and probably also higher mark-ups, on inspections and repairs than other firms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the inspection process and explains how inspectors can exercise discretion. I then describe inspectors' objectives and show how their behavior may be influenced by consumers, regulators, and others in the firm. Section 3 describes the data used in the paper. Section 4 reports and interprets results from simple logits.
Section 5 describes an empirical framework that allows unobserved vehicle characteristics to differ across station types. I then contrast estimates using this framework with the simple logits. Section 6 concludes.
The Market for California Vehicle Emission Inspections
By state law, vehicles must receive emission inspections ("smog checks") in order to be registered in California. The state licenses individuals ("inspectors") to complete inspections and perform emission-related repairs. Inspectors are employed by private firms, which are also licensed by the state. Inspection prices are unregulated. They vary across firms for initial inspections. Most firms do not charge for reinspections of vehicles which initially failed an inspection at the firm, provided that the vehicle was not taken elsewhere for repairs between inspections.
Inspections have two broad components: measurement of tailpipe emissions and a visual Consumers can obtain waivers of the inspection requirement when state officials verify that it 1 would be prohibitively costly to bring their vehicles into compliance. 4 check of emission-related parts. In the "emission component," inspectors place a device that measures hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide emissions in vehicles' tailpipe. Vehicles pass this component if both hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide emissions are below model-year-specific standards when their engines are at idle speed and at 2500 RPM. In the "underhood component," inspectors examine the condition of emission-related parts, particularly those designed to limit evaporative and NO emissions (which are not measured in the emission component). Vehicles pass x this component when inspectors deem that all such parts are connected and functioning.
The inspection procedure is guided by software routines embedded in machines specifically designed for smog checks. These machines prompt inspectors for vehicle-specific information, determine the relevant standards for the emission component, measure emissions, and ask inspectors whether the vehicle passes each part of the underhood component. They then print out the results of the inspection and, if the vehicle passes, the certificate needed for registration. This automation does not eliminate all discretion from the process. Inspectors can change the probability that vehicles fail inspections by adjusting their engine beforehand. They can also do so without making specific repairs. For example, warming up the engine promotes more efficient combustion and lower tailpipe emissions. This lowers the failure probability for the emission component. In the underhood component, inspectors can simply be more or less lenient in determining compliance.
Vehicles fulfill inspection requirements when they pass inspections. Those which fail on the first try generally must be reinspected until they pass. Between inspections, consumers may 1 purchase repairs to lower emissions and increase the likelihood they pass. For some vehicles and 5 at some firms, emission-related repairs are covered by warranties. Federal law requires vehicle manufacturers to provide 5-year/50,000 mile warranties for emission-related repairs. These generally apply only at new car dealers.
Firms', Inspectors', and Consumers' Objectives and Decisions Firms choose their organizational characteristics, whether to supply inspections, and prices in order to maximize profits. Organizational characteristics include their other lines of business, hierarchical structure, and internal incentive schemes. For the purposes of this paper, entry, organizational characteristics, and prices will be taken as exogenously given. The analysis should be interpreted as conditional on these decisions.
Inspectors conduct inspections to maximize their utility, which is a function of income and effort. They are licensed to supply emission-related repairs, and are generally paid a function of the work they complete. Inspectors have an incentive to help vehicles fail because it increases demand for emission-related repairs in the short run. However, inspectors are agents of as many as three sets of principals whose objectives differ. Two are regulators and consumers. Because inspectors' objectives may not coincide with those of their firm, a third category of principals may be their firm's owner or manager. Each of these interested parties may present incentives that influence how inspectors behave.
Regulators prefer that the inspection of a vehicle measures its in-use emissions, and is not distorted by the inspector's actions. If they can demonstrate that inspectors do not help high-emitters pass, regulators can claim that the inspection and maintenance program generates the emission reductions required by environmental legislation. Regulators monitor firms and inspectors and issue Firms and inspectors are fined $250 apiece for the first violation. The amount increases by 2 $250 for each subsequent offense. Regulators may revoke the licenses of inspectors after their fourth offense, and must do so after their fifth.
During 1992, regulators audited each inspection station once on average. While they 3 probably concentrated their efforts on firms suspected of misconduct, they did not target firms very well. For example, regulators did not use inspection data (such as that used in this paper) to target firms for investigation. They began to do so later.
For example, some may prefer the service of new car dealers, even for inspections. Consumers choose a firm to maximize utility. While some consumers may have a non-costrelated component of utility, for most maximizing utility amounts to minimizing the expected cost This is different than in health care markets, where sick patients usually wish to be diagnosed 5 as sick. 7 they visit firms, and sometimes before. Consumers are unable to determine the true emissionrelated condition of their vehicles, and although they may choose among firms on the basis of reputations, they cannot perfectly anticipate how inspectors will exercise their discretion. Thus, repair costs, time and inconvenience costs, etc., are unknown even after a firm is chosen. They also can neither directly observe nor costlessly verify all inspectors' actions. They are thus unable to determine with certainty ex post how much inspectors helped them pass or fail.
One analytically convenient feature of this market is that one can characterize consumers' preferences with respect to inspection outcomes irrespective of their vehicles' underlying condition.
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When emission-related repairs are not covered by warranties, consumers prefer to pass. Passing relieves them of a regulatory requirement that is costly to fulfill. This is true even when inspections reveal that either the performance or the emission-related condition of their vehicle could be improved in ways that they privately value. Passing allows them to purchase repairs to the degree they wish. When repairs are covered by warranties which only apply when vehicles fail, consumers prefer failing inspections to passing them when the benefits they derive from the repairs outweigh any time costs they bear. This may be more likely when their vehicle is close to the end of its warranty period.
Consumers may provide inspectors incentives explicitly through bribes. Alternatively, incentives may be implicit. Inspection outcomes may influence their future choice of firms.
Inspectors may, in turn, believe that "passes" are rewarded with increases in demand in the future, Although bribes are possible in this market, and those that are offered by undercover 6 enforcement officials are sometimes accepted, they are considered by regulators to be a relatively uncommon event. Implicit rewards, on the other hand, may be more common.
Models of equilibrium fraud are in Darby and Karni (1973 ), Wolinsky (1993 ), and Taylor 7 (1995 . See Newhouse (1970) and Evans (1974) for early inducement models. There have been many empirical attempts to test for inducement in health care markets. Recent papers include Birch (1988) , Grytten, Holst, and Laake (1990) , and Gruber and Owings (1996) . This would be predicted from models with switching costs such as Klemperer (1987) . 8 8 both from consumers whose vehicles they inspect and possibly from others. Inspectors' behavior 6 reflects the strength of these demand-side incentives. Consider cases where repairs are not covered by warranties. Finding that inspectors tend to take actions which increase the probability vehicles fail implies that these incentives are relatively weak. This is the situation that exists under some conditions in models of equilibrium fraud or inducement. Finding instead that inspectors tend to 7 help vehicles pass implies that demand-side incentives are relatively strong. They overcome both suppliers' incentive to fail vehicles in general and regulators' attempts to encourage inspectors to fail high-emitters. and Saft (1985) , Rubin (1978) , and Brickley and Dark (1987) .
These geographic markets are: Apple Valley-Hesperia-Victorville ("AHV"), Bakersfield, 10 Fresno, Modesto, and Visalia-Hanford-Tulare ("VHT").
I begin with a sample of all initial inspections, but lose about 15% of the observations because firm characteristics are not available for some firms in these markets. This is because the firm characteristics data was collected in early 1994, over one year after the sample of inspections. By this time, some firms that had supplied inspections in late 1992 had exited the market.
For example, they pull over every fourth or fifth vehicle given that the inspection lane is 11 free.
10 schemes at chain stores may not fully resolve conflicts of interest between owners and non-owner managers. As a result, non-owner managers may monitor individual inspectors less intensively than owners, and inspection conduct may differ accordingly. They related that there was little to be gained in distorting the inspection results. One did 13 not need to distort the results to show that a much higher fraction of vehicles fail roadside inspections than at private firms. Furthermore, if roadside inspectors were intentionally lenient so that failure rates were comparable to those at private firms, the roadside inspection data would not have been considered credible. In every year, a far higher fraction of vehicles failed roadside inspections than initial inspections at private firms.
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The second sample serves as a benchmark. My working assumption is that state officials take no actions that change vehicles' operating condition, and that their judgement on the underhood component is in line with regulations. In conversations with state officials who completed some of these inspections, they told me that this was their intent. Relaxing this assumption to account for 13 the idea that state officials may conduct inspections so that a higher proportion of vehicles fail than if they conducted them "by the books" does not fundamentally change things. As long as state officials would not punish inspectors at private firms for conducting inspections in the way that roadside inspectors do, differences in inspection conduct between roadside inspections and private Both samples contain many variables that are recorded at the time of the inspection. These 14 fall into three general categories: identification, vehicle condition, and test results.
-Identification. This includes identification of the vehicle and firm, and the date and time of the test. The vehicle identification contains many variables, including the model year, the odometer reading, the size of the engine, and whether it is carbureted or fuel injected. The model year and odometer reading allow me to construct a dummy variable ("warranty") which equals one if the vehicle is covered by an emission warranty, and zero otherwise.
-Vehicle Condition. The data contain the percentage of oxygen in the vehicle's exhaust.
Oxygen levels indicate how "rich" or "lean" vehicles' engines are running. Lean-running vehicles tend to have relatively low emissions because their fuel-air ratio is low; there is little unburned fuel in the exhaust. Oxygen levels may also proxy for vehicles' general maintenance level. The variables in the market sample also include whether the inspection corresponded to a biennial registration renewal, a change in registration associated with a change of ownership, or the registration of a vehicle that was previously registered in another state. This is a proxy for the condition of the 15 emission equipment on the vehicle because it indicates the length of time since its previous inspection.
-Inspection Results. This includes the result of the overall inspection, the emission The fact that consumers usually do not pay for reinspections makes their willingness to pay 16 for preinspection repairs very low. It is usually a better strategy to see if the vehicle passes in its existing condition, then purchase the repairs if it does not. The only cost of the second inspection to the consumer would then be the value of the time it takes to conduct one. inspections are younger, but more intensively-driven. By the engine size means, they are also Nine-digit zip codes divide regions finely; hence, consumers purchasing inspections from a 18 firm where "Near" equals one have an alternative practically next door or across the street.
I also asked whether the firms had a "pass or don't pay" policy (one in which consumers pay 19 only for passing inspections) and the price of reinspections. Almost none of the firms had "pass or don't pay"; almost all of them did not charge for reinspections if any emission-related repairs were completed on site.
14 smaller. The mean oxygen levels indicate differences in operating condition. Vehicles in roadside inspections tend to be running "richer" -with higher fuel-air ratios -than those in market inspections.
For the sample of market inspections, I obtain characteristics of the firm conducting the inspection by incorporating data collected by the Bureau of Automotive Repair in station surveys, and by myself in telephone surveys. The station survey data includes "station type," "mode of The survey was only over firms in these two station types because at all other station types, 20 the practice is to pay mechanics an hourly rate plus piece rates. I asked each chain store and tune up shop in my sample how its mechanics were paid. In several cases, I was referred to a regional office. However, in all of these cases, in questioning other firms within the same chain, I was informed of the chain's corporate policy toward payment of mechanics.
Because this is a one in five sample, the number of inspections/firm reported here 21 understates the true number of inspections/firm by a factor of five for each station type.
"Other repairers" is a catch-all category which includes all other station types in the data,
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including brake shops, tire stores, foreign car repair specialists, etc.
15 function of the work they complete ("commission").
20 Table 2 presents sample means by station type. Over half of the market inspections are supplied by independent garages. The next most common category is "smog check specialists."
Although these firms supply some general auto repairs as well, most of their business is likely emissions-related. The number of inspections per firm is highest for this station type. Over three-21 fourths of the inspections take place at either independent garages, service stations, or smog check specialists. In contrast, "chain stores," which include general merchandisers (e.g., Sears) and parts retailers (e.g., Pep Boys), complete a very small share of the inspections in my sample and have the smallest number of inspections/firm.
Failure rates differ across station type. Compared to independent garages, they are significantly higher at chain stores, and significantly lower at new car dealers. There are also differences in vehicle mix. I note several here. The average age, odometer reading, and oxygen level of vehicles inspected at new car dealers are significantly lower than those inspected at independent garages. The average engine size of vehicles inspected at tune up shops is significantly lower than those inspected at independent garages; the average oxygen reading is significantly higher. Vehicles inspected at chain stores are more intensively driven and richer-running than those at independent 16 garages, but the differences in the means are not significant.
Simple Logits
This section reports results from simple logits in which the dependent variable is a dummy variable which equals one if the vehicle failed the overall inspection and zero otherwise. These examine whether, controlling for the vehicle characteristics observed in the data, there are correlations between the probability vehicles fail and firm characteristics. Assuming that unobserved vehicle characteristics are not correlated with the firm and vehicle characteristics included in the specification, the parameters on the firm characteristics indicate differences in inspector behavior.
For expositional purposes, the rest of the section will discuss the results assuming that this holds.
Later, I investigate whether the results change when allowing for differences in unobserved vehicle condition across station types and show that they generally do not. The results confirm that inspectors at private firms behave differently than state officials.
They help vehicles pass. In each specification, the parameter on the state dummy is significantly larger than that on any of the station types except chain store, applying one-tailed t-tests of size 0.05.
One can reject the null that the state and chain store coefficients are the same in the first two Turning to the station type coefficients, there are no systematic differences in conduct across the station types which perform most of the inspections in the market: independent garages, service stations, and smog specialists. Furthermore, the apparent difference between tune up shops and these station types from the first two specifications disappears in the third specification when one controls for differences in the number of inspectors. The contrast between smog specialists and the other 23 types suggests that the fraction of business composed of inspections does not affect inspection
For example, holding all other variables at their sample means, the predicted probability of 24 failure for a five-year-old vehicle is 0.083. For a six-year-old vehicle it is 0.114. Differences are similar using other vintages except for the very oldest and youngest vehicles. conduct. The lack of differences among all of these types suggests that the extent to which firms are integrated into supplying other repair-related services either does not affect inspectors' incentives, or is counteracted by incentives provided within firms. From the contrast between tune-up shops (which are outlets within branded chains) and the other station types, there is little evidence of free riding at the outlet level at tune up shops.
From the new car dealer coefficients in the second and third specifications, inspectors at new car dealers tend to help their non-warranty-covered consumers pass more than inspectors at independent garages. The probability derivative is negative 3-4 percentage points. This is much smaller than the difference in raw failure rates, but it implies that inspection conduct at new car dealers lowers the failure probability for the average vehicle in the sample by 15% relative to that at independent garages. From the vehicle age coefficients, this difference is about the same as the effect of reducing a vehicle's age by one year. Inspection and repair prices (and probably mark-24 ups) are far higher at new car dealers than at other station types. That inspectors help consumers pass more at such firms is consistent with the idea that rents provide firms strong incentives to supply high quality. Combined with the tune up shop coefficient, it is inconsistent with the idea that inspectors will help consumers pass less at firms where consumers generally do not deal with inspectors directly.
The coefficient on the warranty*new car dealer interaction in the second and third specification is positive, but not statistically significant. The fact that there is only weak evidence that inspectors at new car dealers help their non-warranty-covered consumers pass more than their 19 warranty-covered consumers is somewhat troubling: if consumers are indeed providing firms strong incentives, they should fail more when they do not bear the full cost of repairs. However, I find somewhat stronger evidence for this below.
Inspectors at chain stores tend to help vehicles pass much less than inspectors at other firms.
In the third specification, one can reject the null that the chain store coefficient is equal to any of the other station type coefficients using one-tailed t-tests at standard significance levels. The contrast between chain stores and tune up shops is particularly interesting, and implies that high failure rates at chain stores may be due to the weak incentives managers face to monitor and motivate their staff.
This dovetails with the results of Shepard (1993), who shows that gasoline stations are less likely to be refiner-owned (and managed by salaried employees) when they have repair shops attached than when they do not, and attributes this to the difficulty of supplying managers who are not residual claimants incentives when their outlet supplies services that are hard to evaluate internally.
From the third specification, inspectors help consumers pass less at firms with more licensed inspectors. The probability derivative implies that the failure probability is 1 percentage point, or about 5%, higher per inspector. This may be because internal monitoring is more difficult and inspectors have more of an incentive to free ride. From the coefficient on "Near," conduct is slightly more consumer-friendly at firms with very close geographic competitors. One explanation is that it is less costly for consumers to switch firms and obtain second opinions in such circumstances.
There is no evidence of relationships between inspector conduct and either the age of the station or how it is owned. Among chain stores and tune up shops, there is no evidence that paying inspectors piece rates affects how they conduct inspections. All else equal, vehicles inspected in the two least populous markets (AHV and VHT) failed more than those inspected in the other markets. One Some of these they are unlikely to observe at all, such as the firm's ownership structure and 25 how it pays its inspectors. At larger firms, they are unlikely to know how many mechanics are licensed to complete inspections as well. 20 possibility is that this reflects differences in vehicle condition. Smog check requirements only began to apply in AHV during 1991, so most of the vehicles in my sample from this market had never previously been inspected. Alternatively, this may reflect differences in inspector behavior arising from cross-market differences in the strength of competition.
Unobserved Vehicle Characteristics
Framework
If unobserved vehicle characteristics are not independent of the firm and vehicle characteristics included in the model, the estimates presented in the previous section are biased. This would be true, for example, if vehicles inspected by state officials tend to be "dirtier" than those inspected at private firms because they are surprise inspections for which consumers are unable to prepare their vehicles. Unobserved vehicle condition may differ systematically across firms as well.
For example, new car dealers may tend to inspect vehicles that are well-maintained in ways the observed vehicle characteristics do not pick up.
Although this form of selectivity can potentially arise with respect to any or all of the included station characteristics, it is of most concern with respect to the station type dummies. One reason for this concern is that these are the variables of central interest, another is that consumers are probably less likely to select firms on the basis of the other variables. I therefore assume that 25 conditional on station type, other firm characteristics are independent of unobserved vehicle characteristics. I concentrate on possible differences across station types. The framework is adapted
See also Heckman and Singer (1984) , and Cameron and Taber (1994) . See the Appendix for 26 a short summary of work which examines the performance of this type of estimator.
Recall that the state and station type dummies divide the sample into mutually exclusive and 27 exhaustive categories. In this section, "state" will be treated as if it were another station type.
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(1)
from Mroz and Guilkey (1992) .
This vector includes vehicle age, mileage, mileage/age (intensity of use), oxygen level, 28 engine size, and dummies indicating whether the vehicle is a truck, whether it is on warranty, and whether it is changing ownership.
See the Appendix for the likelihood function. 
geographic markets. Z is a vector containing vehicle-specific observables.
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Assume that conditional on X, W, Z, and , the unobserved factors which affect the failure probability and where vehicles are inspected are independent. Then:
where o is the outcome of the inspection, (o O = {P,F}). (Recall that X includes station type dummies.) From this I obtain the unconditional probability by integrating out over the distribution of :
This integral is made tractable by assuming that F( ) is a step function; it becomes a weighted sum.
If there are T points of support and p , t=1,..,T, are the probabilities associated with these points, t then:
The log-likelihood function is then obtained by substituting (5) into (6): where d =1 if station type=k and outcome=o, and J is the number of observations. The parameters of this model include those that determine the distribution of the discrete factor as well as those associated with the right hand side variables in each of the two stages. The discrete factor parameters are the distribution's points of support ( , t=1,...,T) and the density at each t point of support (p , t=1,...T). I normalize E( )=0, assume T=2, and let and equal zero on one t of the multinomial logit branches to identify the model.
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To make estimation tractable, I reduce the number of station types to four: state, independent, dealer, and chain. This greatly reduces the number of parameters estimated in the stage explaining station type. Independent includes independent garages, service stations, smog specialists, used car dealers, and "other repairers": small, independent businesses. Dealer includes new car dealers.
Chain includes chain stores and tune up shops: outlets of branded auto repair chains. Admittedly, this classification is somewhat arbitrary. The intent is to group station types in a way that makes estimates and standard errors on the parameters of interest do not change when this restriction is
The positive and significant coefficient on average inspection price reflects that there are 31 omitted firm characteristics which are correlated with price. Examining a subset of the firms in this paper, Hubbard (1996b) shows that higher priced firms tend to have lower failure rates, conditional on station type. Here, price helps predict station type, but its coefficient does not have a single economic interpretation. 24 relaxed, but near-multicollinearity makes the standard errors on the constants and the distributional parameters very large.
Results Table 4 reports parameter estimates using the above procedure. In the first column, is t restricted to equal zero. This restriction implies that unobserved vehicle condition does not differ across station types. The estimation results are the same as one would get estimating the two stages separately. The second relaxes this restriction. The log-likelihood improves considerably: one can reject the first specification in favor of the second using a likelihood ratio test. The most important difference in the point estimates is that the warranty*new car dealer coefficient becomes much larger. The point estimate is quite noisy: it is statistically significant at the 85% level but not at the 95% level. The fact that the point estimate on this interaction becomes much larger when allowing for differences in unobserved vehicle characteristics suggests that the unobserved condition of warranty-covered vehicles inspected at new car dealers is better than that of the rest of the sample.
Specifications which did not account for this may understate differences in how warranty-covered and non-warranty-covered vehicles are inspected at new car dealers. This result lends more support to one of the main conclusions of this paper: even though consumers cannot verify everything inspectors do, they are able to provide inspectors strong incentives toward helping them obtain the inspection result they prefer at the firms they choose.
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None of the other parameters of interest change much. This is also true in specifications not 25 reported here which include all firm characteristics, and which allow the distribution of unobserved vehicle characteristics to be asymmetric. The results from this paper do not indicate that once one controls for, for example, vehicle age, there are important differences in unobserved heterogeneity across station type. One reason why not much changes may be that most variables that are correlated with vehicle condition are also correlated with vehicle age and are hence (indirectly) controlled for even in simple logits. The interpretations in section four do not change.
Conclusion
Consumers are generally able to provide incentives that lead inspectors to act in their interest at the firms they choose. Inducement or consumer fraud is the exception rather than the rule. In a related paper (Hubbard (1996b) ), I show that consumers' choice of firms is strongly related to both a) the site and outcome of their previous inspection, and b) firms' failure rates across all consumers.
There, I claim this as evidence that multiperiod mechanisms provide firms and inspectors incentives to supply passing inspections.
Whether these demand-side quality incentives are as strong in other "diagnosis-cure" markets is an open question. One important feature of the inspection market is that non-warranty-covered
buyers generally know what treatment they prefer: none at all. This is only true under special circumstances in other diagnosis-cure markets, such as when individuals need to verify their health condition for insurance purposes. If buyers' ability to bring competitive pressures to bear on firms depends on their knowing their preferred treatment, then the results from this market may not extend to many other markets. But there is reason to believe they do, because buyers can generally replicate the circumstances in the inspection market by purchasing diagnoses when they believe that "no treatment" is the correct one. That buyers generally do not do so in auto repair markets, in which
In a celebrated incident, the California Bureau of Automotive Repair accused Sears Auto
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Centers of defrauding consumers during mid-1992. In the aftermath, Sears closed down many of its Auto Centers. At those which remained open, it decided not to supply most repairs that require diagnoses. This paper examines data from the period one to three months after this incident. The contrasts in this paper between chain stores and other firms are robust to a Sears firm effect. 26 many firms offer free estimates, suggests that they believe that the value of this information is low.
They may instead believe that they are already able to provide the sellers they choose incentives to act in their interest. Applying this paper's results to health care markets, competitive pressures may encourage doctors to shade third-party-insured patients' condition so that they receive more care.
Insurers' difficulties in counteracting these incentives when doctors are independent contractors may explain the rise of HMOs.
Most inspections take place at small, independently-owned firms: garages, gas stations, tune up shops, and the like. The same is true for non-warranty-covered auto repairs, especially those which involve diagnoses. In this paper I show that inspectors act less in consumers' interest at larger firms, especially those run by non-owner managers. Failure probabilities increase with the number inspectors. This suggests why most firms supplying non-warranty-covered repairs are small. Within large firms, it may be hard to provide internal incentives which lead mechanics to supply high quality diagnoses. Inspectors at chain stores help consumers pass much less than at other firms. The incentive structure within such firms may be designed to support the majority of the work they do -installing parts purchased within the store, tune ups, oil changes, etc. -but be ill-suited for supplying services involving diagnoses.
The specifications in the paper normalize =0 on the "independent" branch, and restrict p =p =0.5 i 1 2 and = -. 
Properties of the Estimator
Two studies shed light on the small sample performance of this type of estimator in different contexts. Mroz and Guilkey (1992) present Monte Carlo results for discrete factor models in twoequation discrete-continuous systems. Using 100 replications with N=1000, they find that discrete factor models generally perform well using the mean squared error of the parameter estimate of the coefficient on the endogenous dummy variable as a criterion, even when using only two or three points of support. They perform especially well relative to models which assume normality (such as maximum likelihood or two-step estimators) when the true disturbance is non-normal. Mroz and Guilkey also report that standard errors obtained through conventional methods (inverse Hessians) understate true standard errors by 10-50%, although White (1982) standard errors perform best . Cameron and Taber (1994) Note: Omitted dummies are "independent garages," "individual ownership," and "Bakersfield." Omitted dummies are "independent garages," "individual ownership," and "Bakersfield."
